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What is the Supreme Court?
 
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What is the Supreme Court? Why was it established in 2009? And what issues does it hear about? This introductory film is primarily aimed at GSCE/Standard Grade students and explores the role and the workings of the Supreme Court, the only court with UK-wide jurisdiction and the highest court in the land. This video is just one of a range of learning resources on our website designed to aid teaching in the classroom about the law, as well as to complement educational visits to the Court. If you are a teacher or student interested in such a visit, please see the education page on our website for further information.
Views: 87189 UKSupremeCourt
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board
 
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[2015] UKSC 11 UKSC 2013/0136 Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) On appeal from the Inner House of the Court of Session This appeal considered whether a consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist was negligent in her management of the appellant’s pregnancy and labour and, if so, whether this was causative of the child’s brain injury. The mother of a child born with cerebral palsy sued a health board alleging that her treating consultant ought to have warned her of risks of mechanical problems occurring during labour. The mother, a diabetic of small stature, expressed concern to the doctor about whether she would be able to deliver the baby vaginally, and alleged that such concern should have engaged the duty to warn of risks. The defenders argued that only the risk of a grave adverse outcome triggered the duty and that, because the risk of such an outcome was so low and that an expression of concern was not the same as a direct question requiring a direct answer, no warning was required. It was also alleged that delivery by caesarean section ought to have been offered in response to a CTG trace, and that this would have prevented the child’s injury. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal.
Views: 6039 UKSupremeCourt
Article 50 'Brexit' cases
 
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[2017] UKSC 5 UKSC 2016/0196 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) UKSC 2016/0201 REFERENCE by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland from the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland: In the matter of an application for leave to apply for judicial review by Agnew and others UKSC 2016/0205 REFERENCE of a devolution issue by the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland: In the matter of an application by Raymond McCord for Judicial Review On appeal from [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin); [2016] NIQB 85 In the case of Miller and Dos Santos, the question before the Court was ‘Does the Government have power to give notice pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union of the United Kingdom's intention to withdraw from the European Union, without an Act of Parliament providing prior authorisation to do so?’ In the case of the references from Northern Ireland, the Court was asked ‘Does the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union by the exercise of the prerogative power without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland impede the operation of section 1 or section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998?’ The Supreme Court by a majority of 8 to 3 dismisses the Secretary of State’s appeal (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge in the majority with Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath and Lord Hughes dissenting). In a joint judgment of the majority, the Supreme Court holds that an Act of Parliament is required to authorise ministers to give Notice of the decision of the UK to withdraw from the European Union. On the devolution issues, the court unanimously concludes that neither section 1 nor section 75 of the NIA is of assistance in this case, and that the Sewel Convention does not give rise to a legally enforceable obligation.
Views: 9996 UKSupremeCourt
Mr A M Mohamud (in substitution for Mr A Mohamud (deceased)) v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc
 
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[2016] UKSC 11 UKSC 2014/0087 Mr A M Mohamud (in substitution for Mr A Mohamud (deceased)) (Appellant) v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This appeal considered the test for vicarious liability of an employer for his employee's violence to a customer. Mr Mohamud stopped at a Morrisons petrol station. Having made an enquiry to a Morrisons staff member, Mr Khan, he was subjected by Mr Khan to an unprovoked and violent assault. Mr Mohamud sued Morrisons, but the Recorder and (on appeal) the Court of Appeal held that Morrisons was not vicariously liable. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the Claimant’s appeal and holds the Respondent vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, in attacking the Claimant.
Views: 3093 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgment 19th March 2014
 
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[2014] UKSC 19 UKSC 2012/0068 P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) (Appellant) v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another (Respondents) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) UKSC 2012/0088 P and Q (by their litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) (Appellants) v Surrey County Council (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) These appeals concerned the criteria for judging whether the living arrangements made for a mentally incapacitated person amount to a deprivation of liberty. The first case regards P, a thirty-nine year old with severe physical and learning disabilities who was placed under a care package and whether that package imposes such restrictions upon P that he is deprived of his liberty. In the second case the question is whether the living arrangements of a pair of severely mentally handicapped sisters (P & Q) could be viewed as a deprivation of liberty. The Supreme Court, unanimously in the appeal of P, and by a majority of 4 to 3 in the appeal of P and Q, allows the appeals.
Views: 14599 UKSupremeCourt
The history of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
 
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This animated film charts the history of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which today serves as the highest court of appeal for a number of Commonwealth countries, as well as the United Kingdom’s overseas territories, crown dependencies, and military sovereign base areas. The JCPC hears around 40 appeals each year, chiefly in the courthouse it shares with the UK Supreme Court on Parliament Square, London. As this film explains, the origins of the JCPC stretch back to the Curia Regis, or Royal Court, of Norman times. As Parliament developed out of this council, the majority of petitions against decisions of the Sovereign’s courts outside Great Britain and Northern Ireland were referred to the High Court of Parliament, which became the chief appellate tribunal. Over time, this ‘appellate jurisdiction’ transferred to a special committee of the Sovereign’s closest advisers (Privy Counsellors). The present constitution of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is based on the Judicial Committee Act 1833. Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, the Law Lords (now UK Supreme Court Justices) became the permanent judges of the court. Today, all Privy Counsellors who hold or have held high judicial office in the United Kingdom, or have been judges of superior courts of certain Commonwealth countries, are eligible to sit if they are under 75 years of age. With the growth of the British empire, the JCPC’s worked peaked in the early 1900s. Over the years the JCPC has been asked for final rulings and interpretations of many different kinds of law, from Roman Dutch law in appeals from South Africa, to pre-revolutionary French law from Quebec, and Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu law from India. Explore the work of the JCPC in more detail, and read and watch recent decisions and proceedings, at www.jcpc.uk
Views: 7755 UKSupremeCourt
Robinson (Appellant) v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (Respondent)
 
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[2018] UKSC 4 UKSC 2016/0082 Robinson (Appellant) v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The Appellant was a passer-by during an arrest on the street. As the police caught the suspect, she was knocked to the ground. She claimed personal injury damages against the Respondent, alleging police negligence. The Recorder at trial found that the officer who planned the arrest was under a duty to consider the risk to passing members of the public, and had acted negligently. However, there was an immunity of suit for police officers engaged in the apprehension of criminals (the Hill immunity). Therefore the claim was dismissed. The “Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police” immunity protects the police from claims when in the course of their core duties they negligently cause injury to passers-by. The issue in this case is does this apply in a case where the relevant police act was a positive act? Was the Court of Appeal correct to overturn the first instance findings of negligence? The Appeal is allowed. The present case concerned a positive act, not an omission. The reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to the Appellant when the arrest was attempted was enough to impose a duty of care on the officers. The Appellant’s injuries were caused by the officers’ breach of their duty of care; she was injured as a result of being exposed to the danger from which they had a duty of care to protect her.
Views: 2038 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 12th June 2013 - Part 2
 
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[2013] UKSC 34 | UKSC 2013/0004 Petrodel Resources Limited and others (Respondents) v Prest (Appellant)
Views: 4802 UKSupremeCourt
R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor
 
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[2017] UKSC 51 UKSC 2015/0233 R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The issue in this case is whether the Fees Order imposing fees in the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeals Tribunal breached the EU principle of effectiveness, and whether it was indirectly discriminatory. From 29 July 2013, persons bringing claims in the Employment Tribunal, and appealing to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, have been required to pay substantial fees, ranging from £390 to £1600. Following the introduction of fees, official statistics show a dramatic reduction in claims brought. The appellant's challenge to the Fees Order was unsuccessful in two sets of proceedings in the High Court, and on appeal in the Court of Appeal. They now appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal. The Fees Order is unlawful under both domestic and EU law because it has the effect of preventing access to justice.
Views: 2616 UKSupremeCourt
Judicial vacancies at The UK Supreme Court: Deputy President and Justices
 
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The Selection Commission for the appointment of the Deputy President and Justices of the UK Supreme Court has launched its recruitment campaign for a new Deputy President and two, possibly three, Justices. The closing date for applications is midday on Wednesday 26 January 2018. Appointments are expected to take effect between June 2018 and January 2019.
Views: 2458 UKSupremeCourt
Sea Shepherd UK v Fish & Fish Limited
 
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[2015] UKSC 10 UKSC 2013/0133 Sea Shepherd UK (Appellant) v Fish & Fish Limited (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This appeal considered whether Sea Shepherd UK is liable in tort by common design. The appellant is the national branch of an international charity. The respondent brought a claim against it because its ship rammed the respondent’s as part of that international charity’s campaign to stop illegal tuna fishing. The respondent claimed that the appellant was liable in tort either directly—because the ramming was in furtherance of a common design with the international charity—or vicariously—because the master of the ship was acting as the appellant’s servant and not the international charity’s when he ordered the ramming. The trial judge held that the appellant was not liable on either basis. The Court of Appeal held it was liable only by common design. The Supreme Court allows the appeal by a majority of three to two.
Views: 4119 UKSupremeCourt
A day in the life of a Judicial Assistant at the Supreme Court
 
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Judicial Assistants are qualified lawyers who spend a year working with either one or two of the Supreme Court Justices for a legal year. Judicial Assistants carry out research in connection with appeals and summarising applications for permission to appeal. In this short video, current Judicial Assistant Stephanie Needleman, provides a helpful insight into what life as a JA is like, by taking us through a typical day at the Court. The closing date for applications for the legal year 2017-18 is 30 March 2017. For more details and application form, visit: http://www.hays.co.uk/jobs/supremecourt/index.htm
Views: 5486 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgment 16th July 2014 - Part 2
 
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[2014] UKSC 45 UKSC 2013/0049 FHR European Ventures LLP and others (Respondents) v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil division) (England and Wales) This appeal considers whether an agent who receives a secret commission holds the sum paid on constructive trust for his principal(s) giving rise to proprietary rights. The appellant (CCP) entered into an Exclusive Brokerage Agreement with the owners of a hotel in Monte Carlo for CCP to arrange for the sale of the hotel in exchange for a fee of €10m. CCP subsequently acted as agent on behalf of the respondents ("the consortium") in the purchase of the hotel for €211.5 million. Upon discovery by the consortium of the payment of the €10m fee, the consortium commenced action requiring CCP to disgorge the payment to them. The High Court held that CPP was liable to account for the €10m fee to the consortium as insufficient disclosure of the fee had been given to the consortium. However it ruled that there was no constructive trust giving rise to a proprietary right; the claim gave rise only to a personal remedy. This was overruled by the Court of Appeal which held that in receiving the secret commission CCP had exploited an opportunity properly belonging to the consortium. Accordingly the sum was held on constructive trust for the consortium, giving rise to the consortium's consequential proprietary rights in respect of the €10m secret commission. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. Where an agent acquires a benefit which came to his notice as a result of his fiduciary position, or pursuant to an opportunity which results from his fiduciary position, the equitable rule ("the Rule") is that he is to be treated as having acquired the benefit on behalf of his principal, so it is beneficially owned by the principal.
Views: 3102 UKSupremeCourt
Isle of Wight Council (Appellant) v Platt (Respondent)
 
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[2017] UKSC 28 UKSC 2016/0155 Isle of Wight Council (Appellant) v Platt (Respondent) On appeal from the High Court (England and Wales) The respondent requested permission to take his daughter out of school for a holiday. This request was refused by the daughter's head teacher. The respondent took his daughter out of school on holiday for 7 days. As a result, he was issued with a fixed penalty notice in respect of the absence. The respondent did not pay the penalty of £60 by the initial deadline and so he was sent a further invoice for £120. The respondent did not pay this either and so he was prosecuted on the basis of his alleged failure to secure regular attendance at school of his daughter, contrary to s.444(1) of the Education Act 1996. The respondent pleaded Not Guilty before the Isle of Wight Magistrates' Court. The defence submitted that there was no case to answer as the respondent's daughter had in fact attended school regularly. The attendance register showed attendance at 92.3%. The Magistrates' Court held that the respondent's daughter was a regular attender for the purposes of s.444(1), bearing in mind her overall percentage attendance. Therefore, they ruled that there was no case to answer. On appeal, the High Court found that the Magistrates' Court was entitled to take into account attendance outside the offence dates when determining the attendance of the respondent's daughter. The High Court certified a point of law of general public importance on the meaning of the words ‘fails to attend regularly’ in section 444(1), and the case came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the Council’s appeal, declaring that the word ‘regularly’ means ‘in accordance with the rules prescribed by the school’.
Views: 3219 UKSupremeCourt
Lady Hale announces the UK Supreme Court will sit in Belfast in 2018
 
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On Monday 27 November 2017, President of the UK Supreme Court Lady Hale announces that the UK Supreme Court will sit in Northern Ireland next year. The Court will sit in the Inns of Court Library at the Royal Courts of Justice in Belfast, where Lady Hale will be joined by Deputy President Lord Mance, Lord Kerr (former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland), Lord Hodge and Lady Black for up to four days of hearings, commencing on Monday 30 April 2018. One of the cases being heard in Belfast will be Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd, in which the Justices will hear arguments on whether a bakery directly discriminated against a customer on the grounds of sexual orientation when the bakery said they could not fulfil an order for a cake with “Support Gay Marriage” written on it because of their religious beliefs. The Court will also hear a case on whether a policy on allowances for widowed parents breaches human rights laws.
Views: 2732 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 27th November 2013 - Part 1
 
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[2013] UKSC 73 | UKSC 2012/0065 Bull and another (Appellants) v Hall and another (Respondents) On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) The appeal concerns regulations under the Equality Act, specifically whether the Appellants' refusal on religious grounds to let a double room in their hotel to a homosexual couple in a Civil Partnership constituted discrimination under the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007.
Views: 3048 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 19th February 2014 - Part 1
 
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[2014] UKSC 10 UKSC 2012/0113 Williams (Respondent) v Central Bank of Nigeria (Appellant) On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) The issue on this appeal is whether s 21(1)(a) Limitation Act 1980 disapplies the statutory limitation period for actions against accessories to a fraudulent breach of trust. The Supreme Court allows Central Bank of Nigeria's appeal.
Views: 9858 UKSupremeCourt
R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen
 
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[2016] UKSC 8 UKSC 2015/0015 R v Jogee (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (England and Wales) JCPC 2015/0020 Ruddock (Appellant) v The Queen (Respondent) (Jamaica) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Jamaica) In the case of Jogee, following an altercation involving Jogee and Hirsi, which resulted in the death of a third man (Mr Fyfe), the former were both found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Jogee appealed, amongst other grounds, on the basis that, in these circumstances, foresight of a mere possibility that Hirsi would use the kitchen knife with the intention of causing at least serious bodily harm to Mr Fyfe was not enough to found a conviction of murder as against him. The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground of the appeal. The issue in this case was therefore the correct test for establishing joint enterprise. This case was heard with Ruddock (Appellant) v The Queen (Respondent) (Jamaica), a JCPC case which considers whether the appellant’s conviction for joint enterprise murder is unsafe, specifically whether inadmissible evidence was put before the jury and if there were defects in the judge’s directions on the law. The unanimous conclusion of the court is that these appeals should be allowed. The correct rule is that foresight is simply evidence (albeit sometimes strong evidence) of intent to assist or encourage, which is the proper mental element for establishing secondary liability. The judgment and press summary are attached, with the latter also copied below. If you have any queries, please do let me know.
Views: 29744 UKSupremeCourt
Lord Toulson's Valedictory Remarks
 
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Lady Hale, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, led Hugh Southey QC and Tim Eicke QC in giving valedictory remarks on the occasion of Lord Toulson's final sitting in the UK Supreme Court before he reached his statutory retirement age. Lord Toulson was appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court in April 2013. He will now join the Supplementary Panel and therefore can be called upon to sit in future.
Views: 3032 UKSupremeCourt
Cox v Ministry of Justice
 
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[2016] UKSC 10 UKSC 2014/0089 Cox (Respondent) v Ministry of Justice (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) In September 2007, while working as the catering manager at HMP Swansea, the claimant was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a prisoner carrying out paid work under her supervision in the prison kitchen. The claimant claimed that the Prison Service (and, by extension, MoJ) were vicariously liable for the negligence of the prisoner. The Court of Appeal, overturning the decision of the judge, held that the Prison Service was vicariously liable. This appeal considered whether the relationship between the Prison Service and prisoners working in a prison kitchen is capable of giving rise to vicarious liability; and if there is such a relationship, whether it is sufficiently connected to the act of the prisoner to justify the imposition of vicarious liability in this case. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the Ministry of Justice’s appeal.
Views: 3086 UKSupremeCourt
James Rhodes v OPO (by his litigation friend BHM) and another
 
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[2015] UKSC 32 UKSC 2014/0251 MLA (Appellant) v OPO (by his litigation friend BHM) and another (Respondents)* On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) The appellant is a well-known performer. He suffered sexual abuse as a child which led to episodes of severe mental illness, about which he has spoken publicly in the past and wishes to recount in a forthcoming autobiographical book. He has a son, the respondent, who lives abroad and who suffers from a number of health issues. His mother is concerned that publication of the book will come to the boy’s attention and cause him serious harm. She obtained on the respondent’s behalf an injunction to restrain publication on the ground that it was arguable that the publication fell within the scope of the tort of intentionally inflicting harm and that he was likely to establish at the trial that publication should not be allowed. This appeal considered whether the tort in Wilkinson v Downton applies only to false words targeted at an individual, or may apply to publication of true words to the world at large which might result in harm if a particular individual reads it. Additionally it considered whether the Court of Appeal wrongly applied s.12(3) Human Rights Act 1998 when granting an interim injunction to restrain the publication in this case. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal and lifts the book injunction. * This case is now named James Rhodes (Appellant) v OPO (by his litigation friend BHM) and another (Respondents).
Views: 1981 UKSupremeCourt
Armes (Appellant) v Nottinghamshire County Council (Respondent)
 
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[2017] UKSC 60 UKSC 2016/0004 Armes (Appellant) v Nottinghamshire County Council (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The issue in this case is whether the local authority who placed the appellant into foster care is liable in respect of the physical and sexual abuse suffered by the appellant and perpetrated by her foster carers, even though the local authority was not negligent in connection with the foster placement. The appellant was in the care of the respondent local authority from the age of seven to eighteen. The local authority placed the appellant into foster care with Mr and Mrs A between 25 March 1985 and March 1986, and with Mr and Mrs B between 23 October 1987 and 28 February 1988. The appellant had been physically abused by Mrs A, and sexually abused by Mr B. Her claim that the local authority was liable for the abuse she suffered was dismissed by the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court allows the appeal by a majority of 4-1, finding the local authority vicariously liable for the abuse committed by the foster parents, but rejecting the argument that the local authority were liable on the basis of a non-delegable duty.
Views: 1072 UKSupremeCourt
Patel (Respondent) v Mirza (Appellant)
 
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[2016] UKSC 42 UKSC 2014/0218 Patel (Respondent) v Mirza (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) Mr Patel (the respondent) transferred £620,000 to Mr Mirza (the appellant) so that Mr Mirza could use it to bet on share price movements based on inside information. Insider dealing is illegal under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. The inside information was not forthcoming and the agreement was not carried out. Mr Patel has not received the money back from Mr Mirza. In his pleadings at first instance (basing his claim on unjust enrichment and/or a Quistclose trust), Mr Patel set out the facts of the illegal agreement. This appeal considers whether the respondent is entitled to recover money transferred to the appellant in furtherance of a contract entered into for an illegal purpose from which the respondent only withdrew once it could no longer be performed. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses Mr Mirza’s appeal. Mr Patel is entitled to restitution of the £620,000 which he paid to Mr Mirza.
Views: 2416 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 31st July 2013 - Part 1
 
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[2013] UKSC 56 UKSC 2011/0240 R v Hughes (Appellant)
Views: 4732 UKSupremeCourt
Scotch Whisky Association and others v The Lord Advocate and another (Scotland)
 
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[2017] UKSC 76 UKSC 2017/0025 Scotch Whisky Association and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate and another (Respondents) (Scotland) On appeal from the Court of Session (Scotland) The issue in this case is whether the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 is incompatible with European Union law and therefore unlawful under the Scotland Act 1998. The Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 amended the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 by introducing a new paragraph 6A(1) to Schedule 3, requiring that ‘Alcohol must not be sold … at a price below its minimum price'. The Scottish Ministers have prepared a draft order specifying a minimum price per unit of 50 pence but neither the 2012 Act nor the order have been brought into force pending these proceedings. The appellants presented a petition for judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the 2012 Act. The remaining grounds of challenge are that minimum unit pricing is disproportionate as a matter of EU law, operating as a quantitative restriction on the free movement of goods and impacting on the proper functioning of the Common Agricultural Policy's Common Market Organisation on the production, marketing and sale of wine. The appellants argue that alternative pricing measures exist which would be less disruptive of free trade and less distortive of competition across the EU single market, and would have at least an equivalent level of effectiveness in achieving the aim of the Scottish Government to improve public health. The claim was rejected at first instance. The Extra Division of the Inner House hearing the appellants’ reclaiming motion made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU. Following a ruling from the CJEU, the First Division of the Inner House refused the reclaiming motion. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. The 2012 Act does not breach EU law. Minimum pricing is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
Views: 1177 UKSupremeCourt
R (on the application of Evans) and another v Attorney General
 
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[2015] UKSC 21 UKSC 2014/0137 R (on the application of Evans) and another (Respondents) v Attorney General (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This appeal related to whether written communications passing between the Prince of Wales and various government departments should be opened to the public under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 - or if the information should be exempt from disclosure. Mr Evans is a journalist employed by Guardian News and Media Ltd. In April 2005 he sought disclosure under the FOIA of written communications passing between the Prince of Wales and various government departments. The departments refused the request; Mr Evans complained to the Information Commissioner, and subsequently appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal. Proceedings were transferred to the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal ordered that a category of information described as “advocacy correspondence” should be disclosed. The Attorney General made a decision to issue a certificate under s.53(2) FOIA overriding the decision of the Upper Tribunal. Mr Evans sought judicial review of the decision of the Attorney General on the grounds that it was unlawful because it was not based “on reasonable grounds” and was incompatible with the Environmental Information Directive and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the certificate was valid, and in particular (i) whether the Attorney General was entitled to issue a certificate under section 53 FOIA 2000 that he had “on reasonable grounds” formed the opinion that the Departments had been entitled to refuse disclosure; (ii)(a) whether, in any event, regulation 18(6) EIR 2004 complies with the relevant provisions of EU law; and (b) if it does not, whether the certificate can stand even in relation to the non-environmental information. The Supreme Court dismisses the Attorney General’s appeal. By a majority of 5:2 the Court considers that the Attorney General was not entitled to issue a certificate under section 53 FOIA 2000 in the manner that he did and therefore that the Certificate was invalid. By a majority of 6:1 the Court holds that reg.18(6) is incompatible with the 2003 Directive and must be treated as invalid, and therefore that the Certificate would in any event have been invalid insofar as it related to environmental information.
Views: 4423 UKSupremeCourt
Rock Advertising Limited (Respondent) v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited (Appellant)
 
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[2018] UKSC 24 UKSC 2016/0152 Rock Advertising Limited (Respondent) v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The Respondent occupied as licensee premises managed by the Appellant under a written licence agreement. The agreement contained a clause stipulating that all variations to the licence must be made in writing. The Respondent fell behind on its payments, and representatives of the parties discussed rescheduling the Respondent’s debt over the telephone on 27 February 2012. That same day the Respondent paid the Appellant the first instalment due under this proposed schedule. On 29 February the Appellant’s representative informed the Respondent that this was less than the licence fee due. No further payments had been made when on 30 March 2012 the Appellant purported to exercise its right under the licence agreement and locked the Respondent out of the Premises and shortly afterwards gave notice to terminate the agreement. The Appellant issued proceedings to recover the arrears. The Respondent argued that the licence had been orally varied on 27 February 2012 so that it had not been in breach of the varied agreement as of 30 March 2012. The judge held that an oral agreement had been entered into on 27 February 2012, supported by consideration in the practical benefit that the Respondent would honour some and hopefully all of its obligations, but that this was not enforceable due to the anti-oral variation clause contained in the licence. The issues are: Whether an agreement in writing which contains an anti-oral variation clause can be varied other than in accordance with the terms of that clause. Whether the Court of Appeal was wrong to follow a previous Court of Appeal decision in which a relevant contrary authority had not been cited, or a later Court of Appeal decision which considered both earlier decisions and rejected that contrary authority but did so obiter. Whether on the findings of fact by the trial judge, there was a practical benefit which could amount to consideration at law, given the principle that a promise to pay an existing liability cannot amount to good consideration per Re Selectmove [1995] 1 WLR 474. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal. Lord Sumption gives the lead judgment, with which Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Lloyd-Jones agree. Lord Briggs gives a concurring judgment
Views: 852 UKSupremeCourt
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Appellant) v DSD and another (Respondents)
 
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[2018] UKSC 11 UKSC 2015/0166 Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Appellant) v DSD and another (Respondents) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The Respondents were victims of John Worboys, a serial sex offender known as the Black Cab Rapist and thought to be responsible for the drugging and sexual assault of over 100 women. Both NBV and DSD reported their assault to the police, and in NBV’s case Worboys was quickly arrested as a suspect but released without charge. In DSD’s case, he was never identified. Following a review of sexual assault cases by police in February 2008, cases were identified which involved a particular modus operandi by the perpetrator. This resulted in a police media appeal which led to the identification of DSD and NBV as victims as well as numerous other women. Worboys was eventually charged with 23 offences relating to 14 victims and convicted of 19 counts (including the assault on NBV). Both women brought damages proceedings against the police, alleging failure to carry out effective investigations into their complaints that amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issues in this case are: 1.) Whether there is an obligation under section 6 Human Rights Act 1998, read with Article 3 ECHR, to investigate ill-treatment which has been perpetrated by a private individual without any complicity of a public authority and/or; 2.) Whether in the case of such ill-treatment any positive obligation is confined to a requirement to put in place the necessary structure to enable such investigation to be conducted but does not extend to the conduct of an individual investigation into a particular alleged crime. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. In order to be an effective deterrent, laws which prohibit conduct constituting a breach of article 3 must be rigorously enforced and complaints of such conduct must be properly investigated.
Views: 1315 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 18th December 2013 - Part 3
 
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[2013] UKSC 81 | UKSC 2012/0181 AA (Somalia) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer (Addis Ababa) (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) The appeal relates to immigration law, specifically the entitlement to entry clearance of a child seeking entry into the United Kingdom as a de facto adopted child of a sponsor who has previously been granted asylum as a refugee, where the provisions of paragraphs 6, 309A and 352D of the Immigration Rules are not met.
Views: 6032 UKSupremeCourt
Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated v Brownlie
 
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[2017] UKSC 80 UKSC 2015/0175 Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated (Appellant) v Brownlie (Respondent) UKSC 2016/0045 Four Seasons Holdings Incorporated (Respondent) v Brownlie (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the tort jurisdictional gateway test under paragraph 3.1(9)(a) Practice Direction 6B of the CPR, which requires that "damage" be sustained within the jurisdiction, is not satisfied by indirect or consequential damage. The respondent was involved in a motor accident in Cairo in which her husband was killed and she was injured. The accident occurred during an excursion that the respondent had booked several days earlier by telephone from England with the concierge of the Four Seasons Hotel Cairo at Nile Plaza. The respondent brought proceedings, both in her own capacity and as widow and executrix of her late husband’s estate, claiming damages in contract and tort. She obtained permission ex parte to serve out of the jurisdiction in Canada on the appellant corporation, which runs the Four Seasons hotel business. At the inter partes hearing, Master Cook set aside the grant of permission on the basis that the English court did not have jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s claims. Tugendhat J allowed the respondent’s appeal, restoring the order for service out of all of her claims. The Court of Appeal allowed the appellant’s appeal in respect of the respondent’s tort claims in her own capacity and under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, but dismissed the appeal in respect of the respondent’s contract claim and a tort claim made as a dependant of her late husband under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court in relation to the respondent’s contract claim and the claim under the 1976 Act. The respondent cross-appeals in relation to the other tort claims. The Supreme Court unanimously allows Four Season Holdings Incorporated’s appeal. Before permission can be given for service of a claim form outside the jurisdiction, it is necessary for the claimant to establish that his or her claim has a reasonable prospect of success. In this matter, the claim against Holdings lacks reasonable prospects of success. It is therefore unnecessary to consider where the contract was made.
Views: 873 UKSupremeCourt
Michael & others v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police & another
 
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[2015] UKSC 2 UKSC 2013/0043 Michael and others (Appellants) v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and another (Respondents) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This case related to whether the police were liable in negligence and/or in relation to article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of the death of a woman, Miss Michael, following the mishandling of 999 calls she made on the night she was killed. The police accept that the handling of the calls was seriously defective. Miss Michael’s estate and family raised claims in negligence and in terms of article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights against the two police forces involved. At first instance, the claims were allowed to proceed but the Court of Appeal awarded summary judgment in favour of the police on the negligence claim and ruled that the Article 2 ECHR claim should proceed to trial. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court on the negligence claim and the respondents appealed against the Court of Appeal decision on the Article 2 ECHR claim. The Supreme Court dismisses the Appellants’ appeal by a majority of 5-2 (Lady Hale and Lord Kerr dissenting) and unanimously dismisses the Respondents’ cross-appeal. Lord Toulson (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agree) gives the lead judgment. Lady Hale and Lord Kerr give separate judgments both allowing the Appellants’ appeal (in dissent) and dismissing the Respondent’s cross-appeal.
Views: 6794 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 19th June 2013 - Part 3
 
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[2013] UKSC 41 UKSC 2012/0249 Smith and Others (Appellants) v The Ministry of Defence (Respondent) UKSC 2012/0259 Ellis and another (FC) (Respondents) v Ministry of Defence (Appellant) UKSC 2013/0028 Allbutt and others (FC) (Respondents) v The Ministry of Defence (Appellant)
Views: 1937 UKSupremeCourt
Pimlico Plumbers Ltd and another (Appellants) v Smith (Respondent)
 
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[2018] UKSC 29 UKSC 2017/0053 Pimlico Plumbers Ltd and another (Appellants) v Smith (Respondent) The respondent is a plumber who undertook plumbing work for the first appellant between 25th August 2005 and 28th April 2011. The first appellant is a full-service plumbing and maintenance company and the second appellant is its founder and owner. At the material time, the first appellant had 75 office staff and a bank of 125 contractors (including the respondent) that it could call on to carry out jobs for its customers. The respondent commenced proceedings in the Employment Tribunal on 1st August 2011, claiming that he was unfairly or wrongly dismissed by the first appellant. He also claims direct disability discrimination, discrimination arising from disability and failure to make reasonable adjustments. A pre-hearing review was listed to address whether the respondent was an employee of the first appellant, whether he was a worker, whether his working situation met the definition of "employment" in section 83(2)(a) of the Equality Act 2010, or whether he was self-employed in business on his own account. The Employment Tribunal decided that the respondent was not an employee, but that he was a worker and his working situation met the definition of "employment" in section 83(2)(a) of the Equality Act. Accordingly, it had jurisdiction to consider the complaints of direct disability discrimination, discrimination by reason of failure to make reasonable adjustments, and in respect of holiday pay as well as in respect of unauthorised deductions from wages. The appellants’ appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal were dismissed. The issues are: Whether the respondent was a 'worker' within the meaning of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and Regulation 2 of the Working Time Regulations 1998; Whether the respondent was in "employment" within s.83(2)(a) of the Equality Act 2010. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. Lord Wilson gives the judgment with which Lady Hale, Lord Hughes, Lady Black and Lord Lloyd-Jones agree. The tribunal was entitled to conclude that Mr Smith qualified as a ‘worker’ under s.230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (and by analogy the relevant provisions of the Working Time Regulations 1998 and the Equality Act 2010), and his substantive claims can proceed to be heard.
Views: 692 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgments 23rd October 2013 - Part 3
 
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[2013] UKSC 66 | UKSC 2012/0093 Woodland (Appellant) v Essex County Council (Respondent) The appeal concerns the duty of care, specifically the criteria to be applied in determining the circumstances in which a school's duty to its pupils under the National Curriculum can be delegated.
Views: 2232 UKSupremeCourt
Bank of Cyprus UK Limited v Menelaou
 
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[2015] UKSC 66 UKSC 2013/0171 Bank of Cyprus UK Limited (Respondent) v Menelaou (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) The issue in this appeal was is whether the Bank was entitled to an equitable charge over residential property by subrogation to an unpaid ‘vendor's lien’, where the Bank's involvement in the acquisition of the property amounted only to an agreement to release charges over a previous property. The Supreme Court dismisses Ms Menelaou’s appeal.
Views: 1163 UKSupremeCourt
In the matter of J (A child)
 
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[2015] UKSC 70 UKSC 2015/0176 In the matter of J (A child) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This appeal related to whether the courts of England and Wales had jurisdiction to make an order for the return of J to Morocco; in particular the interpretation of the requirement of urgency within Article 11 of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children ("the 1996 Hague Convention"). The Supreme Court unanimously allows the father’s appeal, holding that it is open to the English courts to exercise the article 11 jurisdiction in cases of wrongful removal under the 1996 Convention, and it orders that the case be returned to the High Court for a decision as to whether it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances of this case. Lady Hale, with whom the other justices all agree, gives the only substantive judgment.
Views: 3025 UKSupremeCourt
MT Højgaard A/S v E.On Climate & Renewables UK Robin Rigg East Limited and another
 
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[2017] UKSC 59 UKSC 2015/0115 MT Højgaard A/S (Respondent) v E.On Climate & Renewables UK Robin Rigg East Limited and another (Appellants) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The issue in this case is whether a contract for the design and installation of foundations for an offshore windfarm in the Solway Firth imposed a fitness for purpose obligation on the contractor amounting to a warranty that said foundations would have a service life of 20 years. The Supreme Court unanimously allows E.ON’s appeal.
Views: 581 UKSupremeCourt
UK Supreme Court Judgment 30th July 2014 - Part 3
 
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[2014] UKSC 49 UKSC 2013/0108 Healthcare at Home Limited (Appellant) v The Common Services Agency (Respondent) (Scotland) On appeal from the Court of Session This appeal relates to an invitation to tender process and whether the Inner House (Second Division) erred: (i) in its formulation of the duty of transparency and clarity imposed by Regulation 4(3) of the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006; (ii) in concluding that the respondent's invitation to tender complied with the requisite standards of transparency and clarity; (iii) in deciding that correspondence sent by the respondent to the appellant after the respondent's decision was sufficiently transparent and clear; and (iv) in failing adequately to explain its decision. The appeal also considered whether a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union is necessary to clarify the nature and scope of the applicable duties of transparency and clarity, and the proper application of those duties in this case. In this particular case, the respondent had issued an invitation to tender on behalf of such Scottish health authorities as might subsequently elect to participate in it. The invitation concerned the award of a single-supplier framework for compounding, dispensing and delivering the drug Trastuzumab (otherwise known as Herceptin), as well as providing a nursing administration and support service to patients within their own homes. The appellant had for the previous eight years been providing certain Scottish health authorities with services the framework agreement was designed to replace. The appellant's tender was unsuccessful, and the contract was awarded to BUPA Home Health Care. The appellant challenged that decision, alleging that the respondent had breached certain duties under the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006. In response to the appellant's original letter of challenge, the respondent sent further information which, according to the appellant, disclosed further breaches of the 2006 Regulations. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal by Healthcare at Home Limited.
Views: 1423 UKSupremeCourt
Judgment:  McDonald (Deceased) v National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc
 
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[2014] UKSC 53 UKSC 2013/0263 McDonald (Deceased) (Represented by Mrs Edna McDonald) (Appellant) v National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc (Respondent) UKSC 2013/0267 McDonald (Deceased) (Represented by Mrs Edna McDonald) (Respondent) v National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil division) (England and Wales) Mr McDonald was diagnosed with mesothelioma in July 2012. He believes he was exposed to asbestos in the course of his work as a lorry driver, collecting loads of fuel ash from Battersea Power Station between 1954 and 1959. On his visits he sometimes entered the power station and witnessed others working with asbestos. He brought proceedings against the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) which is the successor to his former employers, and against National Grid, the successor to the occupier and operator of Battersea Power Station. The claims alleged negligence on the part of both, and breach of statutory duty under the Factories Act 1937 and under the Asbestos Industry Regulations 1931 on the part of National Grid. The trial judge dismissed all of Mr McDonald’s claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that National Grid had been in breach of statutory duty under the Asbestos Industry Regulations but dismissed the appeal under the Factories Act ruling there was insufficient evidence to prove that Mr McDonald was exposed to a “substantial” amount of dust. The appeal to the Supreme Court is by both parties. National Grid has appealed to the Supreme Court in the first appeal and Mr McDonald’s representative has cross-appealed in the second appeal. The Supreme Court dismisses National Grid’s appeal and dismisses the cross-appeal. On the appeal, the decision was by a majority of three (Lord Kerr gives the lead judgment and Lady Hale and Lord Clarke give concurring judgments) to two (Lord Reed, with whom Lord Neuberger agreed). On the cross-appeal, the decision was by a majority of four to one, with Lady Hale in the minority.
Views: 2073 UKSupremeCourt
Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Limited & another
 
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[2015] UKSC 72 UKSC 2014/0158 Marks and Spencer plc (Appellant) v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Limited and another (Respondents) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This dispute related to four commercial leases undertaken by M&S with the respondents, which contained ‘Break Clauses’ allowing early termination by the retailer. The issue was whether it is an implied term of a lease that a tenant who makes quarterly rent payments in advance is entitled to repayment, upon termination of the lease under a Break Clause, of rents attributable to the period after the Break Date. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses Marks and Spencer’s appeal.
Views: 1176 UKSupremeCourt
Bailey and another (Respondents) v Angove's PTY Limited (Appellant)
 
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[2016] UKSC 47 UKSC 2014/0106 Bailey and another (Respondents) v Angove's PTY Limited (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) The appellant terminated its Agency and Distribution agreement with D&D Wines International Limited (D&D). There was a dispute as to whether, after the notice of termination, D&D's liquidators still had authority to collect money owed to the appellant and whether any money it collected would be held on trust for the appellant. The issues in this case were 1) whether the Court of Appeal was correct to hold that the general rule that the authority of an agent can be terminated even if that is a breach of contract as between agent and principal, yielded to what the parties agreed should be their respective rights and obligations under the agency agreement, and 2) whether the Court of Appeal was correct to hold that a constructive trust did not arise when D&D, as agent, received money from third parties for onwards transmission to its principal, Angove's PTY Limited (Angove), in circumstances where D&D was insolvent. The Supreme Court unanimously allows Angove’s appeal on the first question. D&D’s agency was revoked by Angove’s termination notice, but the moneys were not held on constructive trust for Angove’s.
Views: 1143 UKSupremeCourt
Lord Hope's Valedictory Remarks
 
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Frank Mulholland QC, Lord Advocate; Richard Keen QC, Dean of the Faculty of Advocates; Lord Pannick QC; James Guthrie QC and Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court all give valedictory remarks on the occasion of Lord Hope's final sitting in the UK Supreme Court. Lord Hope was Deputy President of the Supreme Court from its opening in October 2009 and was one of the Court's two Scottish Justices. He sat as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary from 1996 and so has been one of the UK's top appeal court judges for 17 years, retiring on 27 June 2013.
Views: 16112 UKSupremeCourt
The Christian Institute and others v The Lord Advocate (Scotland)
 
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[2016] UKSC 51 UKSC 2015/0216 The Christian Institute and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland) On appeal from the Inner House of the Court of Session The Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 ("the 2014 Act") established a framework for a scheme creating a new public service in Scotland referred to as the "named person service". The scheme is to be made available by certain service providers to every child and young person in Scotland (other than those serving in the UK Armed Forces). Under the scheme, an identified individual - "a named person" - is to be made available to every child and young person within the scope of the legislation. That named person is required to exercise statutory functions, including providing advice, information or support. These functions must be exercised where the named person considers it to be appropriate in order to promote, support or safeguard the wellbeing of the child or young person. The appellants are four registered charities and three individuals. In July 2014, they lodged a petition for judicial review challenging the lawfulness of certain provisions of the named person scheme under the 2014 Act on the grounds that they purported to authorise unjustifiable state interference with family rights. In January 2015, the Lord Ordinary dismissed the appellants' petition. The appellants' reclaimed, but their reclaiming motion was dismissed by the Inner House in September 2015. They appealed to the Supreme Court. The issues before the Supreme Court were whether the provisions of the 2014 Act are compatible with (a) fundamental common law rights; and (b) the ECHR and whether provisions concerning sharing and disclosure of information are compatible with EU law or relate to matters reserved to the Westminster Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal on the basis of the ECHR Challenge and the EU Law Challenge (to the extent it mirrors the ECHR Challenge). The Court invites written submissions as to the terms of its order under s.102 of the Scotland Act in order to give the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers an opportunity to address the matters raised in the judgment. In the meantime, since the defective provisions of Part 4 of the 2014 Act are not within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, they cannot be brought into force.
Views: 2691 UKSupremeCourt
R (on the app. of Nouazli) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
 
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[2016] UKSC 16 UKSC 2014/0139 R (on the application of Nouazli) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales) This case considered whether the power under Reg.24(1) of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 ("EEA Regulations") to detain prior to a deportation decision discriminates without lawful justification against EEA nationals and their family members. The appellant, who is Algerian and married to an EEA national, was detained pursuant to Reg.24(1) of the EEA Regulations pending a decision being taken whether to deport him. There is no equivalent provision for pre-decision detention in relation to family members of British nationals or non-EEA nationals, unless the detainee has previously been sentenced to a minimum of 12 months in prison. The applicant contends that his detention was unlawful in that it was discriminatory and inconsistent with EU law. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses Mr Nouazli’s appeal, thereby holding that the appellant’s pre-decision detention was not unlawful. It further declines to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU.
Views: 1421 UKSupremeCourt
Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Limited v Haven Insurance Company Limited
 
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[2018] UKSC 21 UKSC 2016/0010 Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Limited (Respondent/Cross-Appellant) v Haven Insurance Company Limited (Appellant/Cross-Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeal erred in allowing the respondent solicitors firm’s claim for equitable interference against the appellant insurer to recover its costs under conditional fee agreements after the appellant had compromised the underlying claims directly with the respondent’s clients on terms which did not provide for the payment of the respondent’s costs. Six individuals were involved in road traffic accidents involving vehicles insured by the appellant insurance company. They all entered into CFAs with the respondent solicitors firm, which notified the claims via the online claims portal (in accordance with the pre-action protocol for road traffic accidents). Each claim was acknowledged by the appellant, which then made offers to compromise the claims on an inclusive basis. All of the individuals eventually accepted these offers and cancelled their CFAs with the respondent firm. The respondent claimed against the appellant for its fixed costs which it might have recovered had the claims been settled in accordance with the pre-action protocol. The claim was dismissed at first instance, but the Court of Appeal allowed the firm’s appeal in respect of its claim based on equitable interference. The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal. Gavin Edmondson Solicitors are entitled to the enforcement of the traditional equitable lien against Haven Insurance Company Limited, as the client owed a contractual duty to pay the solicitors’ charges. However, the equitable lien should not have been modernised in the manner undertaken by the Court of Appeal.
Views: 850 UKSupremeCourt
Carlyle v Royal Bank of Scotland
 
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[2015] UKSC 13 UKSC 2013/0227 Carlyle (Appellant) v Royal Bank of Scotland (Respondent) (Scotland) On appeal from the Second Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session The Appellant is a property developer who sought loans from the Respondent Bank to buy and develop certain plots of land. The Respondent, knowing that the Appellant needed funding for both the purchase and development of the plots, confirmed by telephone “it’s all approved” – which the Appellant took as a commitment that the Respondent would provide loans for both the purchase price and the development cost of £700,000. Written loan agreements were signed in relation to the purchase price, but not for the development cost. It was subsequently made clear to the Appellant that development funding would be available in due course, subject to terms and conditions. Funds were provided for the sale price, but the Respondent refused to provide development funding. The Respondent brought an action for payment under the written loan agreements and the Appellant counterclaimed for breach of a collateral warranty on the part of the Respondent to provide a loan facility for the development cost. A number of issues were considered in this appeal including whether Scots law recognises a collateral warranty as “something which exists as a free standing legal entity outwith a contract”. It also considered whether there was “an agreement on all the essentials” of a putative obligation to lend, and whether the parties did not intend to be bound until agreement was rendered in writing and executed. It also considered whether the Second Division was correct to hold that the court below had erred in finding that the Respondent was in breach of an obligation to make available loan funds for the development of land. The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal, sets aside the interlocutor of the Second Division and remits the case to a commercial judge in the Court of Session to proceed accordingly.
Views: 1486 UKSupremeCourt
JSC BTA Bank (Respondent) v Khrapunov (Appellant)
 
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[2018] UKSC 19 UKSC 2017/0043 JSC BTA Bank (Respondent) v Khrapunov (Appellant) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The respondent bank had obtained a worldwide freezing order (WFO) and a receivership order, as well as money judgments, against Mr Ablyazov. On 17 July 2015 it issued a claim form for the tort of unlawful means conspiracy against both Mr Ablyazov and the appellant (Mr Ablyazov’s son-in-law), alleging that they conspired together to injure the respondent by preventing it from enforcing its judgments against Mr Ablyazov’s assets. The unlawful means are alleged by the respondent to be dealings with such assets in breach of the freezing and receivership orders. The respondent subsequently obtained a WFO against the appellant. The issues in this case are: Is it permissible to maintain a claim for unlawful means conspiracy where the only unlawful means relied on are acts which are said to be unlawful only because they are breaches of court orders? For the purposes of establishing jurisdiction under limb (b) of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention 2007, is the place of the "event giving rise to [the damage]" the place where the conspiratorial agreement was made, or the place where the lawful means were executed? The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the appeal, finding that: The alleged breaches of the freezing and receivership orders in contempt of court amount to “unlawful means” for the purposes of tort of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means. The courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction under article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention because that is the jurisdiction ‘where the harmful event occurred’. The place where the conspiratorial agreement was made was the place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of the damage.
Views: 888 UKSupremeCourt
Lord Mance’s Valedictory Remarks – Wednesday 6 June 2018
 
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Sir Sydney Kentridge QC, Lord David Pannick QC, Peter Knox QC and the President of the Supreme Court, Lady Hale, all gave remarks on the occasion of Lord Mance’s valedictory in the UK Supreme Court. Lord Mance himself also gave a speech. Lord Mance became a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in 2005. He was from 1999 to 2005 a Lord Justice of Appeal and from 1993 to 1999 a Judge of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, where he also sat in the Commercial Court. He became Deputy President of The Supreme Court in September 2017, following his original appointment as a Justice of The Supreme Court in October 2009.
Views: 1060 UKSupremeCourt
R (Lord Carlile of Berriew QC and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
 
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[2014] UKSC 60 UKSC 2013/0098 R (on the application of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC and others) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil division) (England and Wales) This appeal related to the Secretary of State’s decision to maintain the prohibition on an Iranian dissident entering the United Kingdom and whether this decision was a disproportionate restriction of the rights of the Appellants to freedom of expression. The first to fifteenth Appellants are cross-party members of the House of Lords and the House of Commons ("the Parliamentary Appellants"). The sixteenth Appellant, Mrs Maryam Rajavi, is a dissident Iranian politician resident in Paris who has been excluded from the United Kingdom since 1997. The Parliamentary Appellants wished to invite Mrs Rajavi to address meetings in Westminster to discuss important diplomatic issues relating to Iran, and Mrs Rajavi was and is willing to come. The Secretary of State maintained Mrs Rajavi’s exclusion on foreign policy/security grounds, in particular because there was a risk that, if permitted to enter the UK, there would be retaliation by the Iranian regime including the risk of damage to the British Embassy in Tehran and mistreatment of embassy staff. The Appellants contended there had been interference with their Article 10 rights (freedom of expression) caused by decisions of the Secretary of State in 2011/2 to maintain Mrs Rajavi’s exclusion from the UK. The Appellants’ application for judicial review was dismissed by the Divisional Court and their appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal who both held the exclusion to be justified and proportionate. The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal by a majority of 4-1.
Views: 10784 UKSupremeCourt
Morris-Garner and another (Appellants) v One Step (Support) Ltd (Respondent)
 
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[2018] UKSC 20 UKSC 2016/0086 Morris-Garner and another (Appellants) v One Step (Support) Ltd (Respondent) On appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales) The first appellant (“KMG”) set up what became One Step Support Limited (“One Step”) in May 1999 as a business providing support for young people leaving care, employing the second appellant (“AMG”) in 2001. KMG sold 50% of One Step to Mr and Mrs Costelloe in 2002. In 2004, relations deteriorated between KMG and the Costelloe family. By late 2006, as a result of the operation of deadlock provisions in the shareholders’ agreement, KMG sold her shareholding to the Costelloes for £3.15m. As part of the sale agreement, AMG and KMG entered into restrictive covenants not to compete with One Step or knowingly solicit any significant clients of One Step for 36 months, and AMG covenanted not to disclose information concerning One Step’s business transactions or clients for the same period. Subsequently, Positive Living Limited ("PL"), a company incorporated by the appellants in 2004, began to compete with One Step. In 2010, the appellants sold their shares in PL for £12.8m. One Step issued proceedings on 11 July 2012. The judge at first instance held that the appellants had breached the covenants and that One Step were permitted to obtain Wrotham Park damages, by a measure of a percentage of the sale proceeds of PL. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge on both counts. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court only on the question of whether it was correct to find that One Step were entitled to Wrotham Park damages. The issue is: where a defendant is found to have breached a restrictive covenant, what are the circumstances in which it is permissible to award damages measured as a percentage of the defendant’s profits resulting from the breach? The Supreme Court allows the appeal on the basis that the courts below erred in their approach to the assessment of damages. The substance of the claimant’s claim is for financial loss, which can be quantified in a conventional manner. The claimant did not suffer the loss of a valuable asset created or protected by the right infringed, and so is not entitled to negotiating damages. The case should now return to the High Court for a hearing on quantum.
Views: 660 UKSupremeCourt